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Summary findings
Mishkin  examines  changes  in monetary  policy  in  By increasing  transparency  and  accountability,
industrial  countries  by evaluating  and  providing  case  inflation  targeting  helps  promote  central  bank
studies  of monetary  targeting  and  inflation  targeting.  independence.  Accountability  to the general  public  seems
Inflation  targeting  has successfully  controlled  inflation,  to work  as well as direct  accountability  to the
with some  qualifications.  It weakens  the  effects  of  government.  Inflation  targeting  is consistent  with
inflationary  shocks,  as examples  from  Canada,  Sweden,  democratic  principles.
and the  United  Kingdom  show.  It can promote  growth  In  discussing  operational  design,  Mishkin  explains,
and does  not  lead to increased  fluctuations  in output.  But  among  other  things,  that
inflation  targets  do not  necessarily  reduce  the cost  of  *  Inflation  targeting  is far from  a rigid rule.
reducing  inflation.  *  Inflation  targets  have  always been  above  zero  with
T he key to the success  of inflation  targeting  is its stress  no loss of credibility.
on transparency  and  communication  with  the public.  *  Inflation  targeting  does  not  ignore  traditional
Inflation  targeting  increases  accountability,  which  helps  stabilization  goals.
ameliorate  the time-inconsistency  trap  (in which  the  *  Avoiding  undershoots  of the  inflation  target  is as
central  bank  tries  to expand  output  and employment  in  important  as avoiding  overshoots.
the short  run by pursuing  overly  expansionary  monetary  *  When  inflation  is initially  high,  inflation  targeting
policy).  Time-inconsistency  is more  likely  to come  from  may  have to be phased  in after  disinflation.
political  pressures  on the central  bank  to engage  in  *  The  edges  of the  target  range  can take  on a life of
overly  expansionary  monetary  policy.  A key advantage  of  their  own.
inflation  targeting  is that  it helps  focus  the political  Targeting  asset  prices  such as the  exchange  rate
debate  on what  a central  bank  can  do in the long  run  worsens  performance.
(control  inflation)  rather  than  what  it cannot  do  (raise
economic  growth  and  the number  of jobs permanently
through  expansionary  monetary  policy).
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, central banks in industrialized countries have made great strides in the
conduct of monetary policy.  Inflation has been reduced to levels that are consistent with price
stability, while economic growth has not  suffered:  to the contrary, once price stability was
achieved, growth rates of the aggregate  economy have been high.
How has this improved performance of monetary policy come about?  This paper looks
at the evolution of monetary policy in industrialized countries by studying monetary targeting
and inflation targeting, two basic strategies which allow monetary policy to focus on domestic
considerations.'  The paper provides brief case studies of countries that have adopted these two
strategies and draws a set of lessons that should be valuable not only for industrialized countries
but emerging market countries as well.
II.
MONETARY  TARGETING:
EXPERIENCE  IN INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES
A monetary targeting strategy comprises three elements:  1) reliance on  information
conveyed by a monetary aggregate to conduct monetary policy, 2) announcement of targets for
monetary aggregates, and 3) some accountability mechanism to preclude large and systematic
deviations from the monetary targets.
In the 1970s, monetary targeting was adopted in several industrialized countries.  Here
we briefly describe that experience in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, in
which  monetary targeting was  not  particularly successful,  and  then  go  on  to  examine  the
experience in the more successful monetary targeters, Germany and Switzerland. 2
'I discuss  monetary  policy strategies  which use exchange  rate targets  and thus cannot  focus  on
domestic  considerations  in Mishkin  (1999a).
2Bernanke  and Mishkin  (1992)  and Mishkin  and Posen  (1997)  contain  more  detailed  discussion  of
these countries'  experiences  with monetary  targeting.
IUnited States, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Beginning in 1970, as a result of increasing concerns about inflation the FOMC of the Federal
Reserve selected weekly tracking paths  for Ml  and  indicated its preferred behavior for M2
(Meulendyke, 1990). Then in  1975, in response to a Congressional resolution, the Fed began
to  announce publicly its  targets  for money growth.  In practice, however, the  Fed  did  not
consider achieving the money growth targets to be of high priority, placing higher weight on
reducing unemployment and  smoothing interest rates. 3 This  is reflected in the fact that Ml
growth  had  an  upward  trend  after  1975  despite  declining  target  ranges.  Furthermore,
unemployment declined steadily after 1975 with inflation rising sharply.
In October 1979, the Fed changed its operating procedures to deemphasize the federal
funds rate as its operating target and  supposedly increased its commitment to the control of
monetary aggregates by  adopting  a non-borrowed reserves, operating target.  However, this
change in operating procedures did not result in improved monetary control:  fluctuations in MI
growth increased, rather than decreased as might have been expected, and the Fed missed its
Ml  growth targets in all three years of the 1979-82 period.  It appears (e.g., see Bernanke and
Mishkin, 1992, and Mishkin, 2001) that controlling monetary aggregates was never the intent
of the 1979 policy shift, but rather was a smokescreen to obscure the need of the Fed to raise
interest rates to very high levels to reduce inflation. In addition, the growing unreliability of the
relationship  of  monetary  aggregates  to  nominal  GDP  and  inflation,  raised  concerns  that
monetary aggregates were no longer useful as a guide to the conduct of monetary policy.  In
October 1982, with inflation in check, the Fed began to deemphasize monetary aggregates, and
in February 1987, the Fed announced that it would no longer even set Ml  targets.  Finally, in
July 1993, Alan Greenspan testified in Congress that the Fed would no longer use any monetary
targets, including M2, as a guide for the conduct of monetary policy.
As in the United States, the United Kingdom introduced monetary targeting in the mid-
1970s in response to mounting  inflation concerns.  Informal targeting of a  broad aggregate,
sterling M3, began in late 1973, and forrnal publication of targets began in 1976.  The Bank of
England had great difficulty in meeting its M3 targets in the 1976-79 period.  Not only were
announced targets consistently  overshot, but the Bank of England frequently revised its targets
midstream or abandoned them  altogether.  Although inflation fell subsequent to the 1973 oil
3The  Fed also  pursued  other objectives  during  the monetary  targeting  period  such as the exchange  rate
and financial  market  stability.
2price  shock, starting  in  1978,  inflation in  the United Kingdom began to  accelerate again,
reaching nearly 20% by 1980.
As in the United States, the perception of an inflationary crisis led to a change in strategy
in early 1980, with Prime Minister Thatcher introducing the Medium-Term Financial Strategy
which proposed a  gradual deceleration of M3 growth.  Unfortunately, the British monetary
policy strategy ran into a technical problem similar to that experienced in the United States:  the
relationship between the targeted aggregate and nominal income became very unstable.  After
1983, arguing that financial innovation was wreaking havoc with the relationship between M3
and nominal income, the Bank of England began to deemphasize M3 in  favor of a narrower
aggregate, MO (the monetary base).  The target for M3 was temporarily suspended in October
1985 and was dropped altogether in 1987.  Until the British entered the ERM and pegged the
value of the pound to the deutsche mark, MO growth rate was not too far from its target ranges.
However from 1987 to  1990, MO growth was on the high side because the authorities wanted
to stop the appreciation of the pound.
Canada also  responded  to  its  significant inflation problems  by  instituting monetary
targeting in  1975 under  a program of "monetary gradualism" in which Ml  growth would be
controlled with a gradually falling target range.  Monetary gradualism was no more successful
in Canada than were the attempts at monetary targeting in the United States and the United
Kingdom.  Although MI growth was often close to target and the goal of reducing Ml  growth
wash  achieved during  the  latter part  of  the  1970s, Canada  like  the  other  two  countries
experienced a resurgence of inflation.  By 1978, only three years after monetary targeting had
begun,  the Bank of  Canada  began to  distance itself  from  this  strategy out  of  concern  for
exchange rate movements and uncertainty about MI  as a reliable guide to monetary policy.  In
November 1982, MI  targets were abandoned, with Gerald Bouey, the Governor of the Bank of
Canada  describing the  situation  by  saying, "We  didn't  abandon monetary  aggregates, they
abandoned us."
A feature of monetary targeting in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom
was that  there was  substantial  gameplaying in  which  their  central banks  targeted multiple
aggregates, allowed base drift (by applying target growth rates to a new base at which the target
ended up every period), did not announce targets on a regular schedule, used artificial means
to  bring  down the  growth  of  a  targeted aggregate  (the  infamous  "corset"  in  the  United
Kingdom), often overshot their targets without reversing the overshoot later, and often obscured
3why deviations from the monetary targets occurred. 4
Monetary targeting in  these three countries was not successful in controlling inflation
and there are two interpretations for why this occurred.  One is that because monetary targeting
was not pursued seriously, as the central bank gameplaying described above suggests, it never
had a chance to be successful.  The other is that growing instability of the relationship between
monetary aggregates and goal variables such as inflation (or nominal income) meant that this
strategy was doomed to failure and indeed should not have been pursued seriously.
Germany and Switzerland.
Germany and  Switzerland  officially engaged  in  monetary targeting  for  over  twenty  years
starting at the end of  1974.  Their success in controlling inflation is the reason that monetary
targeting still has strong  advocates and is  an  element  of  the official policy regime  for the
European Central Bank.
The monetary  aggregate chosen by  the Germans was central bank  money, a  narrow
aggregate which is the sum of currency in circulation and bank deposits weighted by the 1974
required reserve ratios. In 1988, the Bundesbank switched targets from central bank money to
M3.  The Swiss  began targeting the MI  monetary  aggregate, but  in  1980 switched to  the
narrower monetary aggregate, MO,  the monetary base.
The key fact about monetary targeting regimes in Germnany  and Switzerland is that the
targeting regimes were  very  far  from a  Friedman-type monetary targeting rule  in  which  a
monetary aggregate is kept on a constant-growth-rate path and is the primary focus of monetary
policy. As Otmar Issing, at the time the Chief Economist of the Bundesbank noted, "One of the
secrets of success of the German policy of money-growth targeting was that ... it often did not
feel bound by monetarist orthodoxy as far as its more technical details were concerned." 5 The
Bundesbank allowed growth outside of its target ranges for periods of two to three years, and
overshoots of its  targets  were  subsequently reversed.  Monetary targeting in  Germany and
Switzerland was instead primarily a method of communicating the strategy of monetary policy
that focused on long-run considerations and the control of inflation.
The calculation of monetary target ranges put great stress on making policy transparent
4See  Bernanke  and Mishkin  (1992)  and Mishkin  (2001)  for more  details  on the games  that the central
banks  played.
5Otmar  Issing,  (1996),  page 120.
4(clear, simple and understandable) and on regular communication with the public.  First and
foremost, a numerical inflation goal was prominently featured in the setting of target ranges
which was a very public exercise.  The Bundesbank's setting of targets used a quantity theory
equation to  back  out  the  monetary  target  growth rate  using  the  numerical  inflation goal,
estimated potential output growth and expected velocity trends.  Second, monetary  targeting,
far from being a rigid policy rule, was quite flexible in practice.  The target ranges for money
growth were missed on the order of fifty percent of the time  in Germany, often because the
Bundesbank's  concern  about  other  objectives,  including  output  and  exchange  rates. 6
Furthermore, the Bundesbank demonstrated its flexibility by allowing its inflation goal to vary
over time and to converge slowly to the long-run inflation goal quite gradually.
When the Bundesbank first set its monetary targets at the end of 1974, it announced a
medium-term inflation goal of 4%, well above what it considered to be an appropriate long-run
goal for inflation. It clarified that this medium-term inflation goal differed from the long-run
goal by labelling it the "unavoidable rate of price increase".  Its gradualist approach to reducing
inflation led to a period of nine years before the medium-term inflation goal was considered to
be consistent with price stability.  When  this occurred at the end of 1984, the medium-term
inflation goal was renamed  the "normative rate  of price increases" and  was  set at 2%  and
continued at this level until  1997 when it was changed to  1.5 to 2%.  The Bundesbank also
responded to negative supply shocks, restrictions in the supply of energy or raw materials which
raised the price  level, by  raising its  medium-term inflation goal:  specifically it  raised the
unavoidable rate of price increase from 3.5% to 4% in the aftermath of the second oil price
shock in 1980.
The monetary targeting regimes in Germany and Switzerland  demonstrated a  strong
commitment to the communication of the strategy to the general public.  The money-growth
targets were continually used as a framework for explanation of the monetary policy strategy
and both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank expended tremendous  effort, both in
their publications and in  frequent speeches by central bank officials, to  communicate to  the
public what  the central bank was trying to  achieve.  Indeed, given that both  central banks
frequently missed their money-growth targets by significant amounts, their monetary-targeting
frameworks are best viewed as a mechanism for transparently communicating how monetary
policy was being directed to  achieve their inflation goals and  as a means  for increasing the
accountability  of the central bank.
6See  Von  Hagen  (1995),  Neumann  (1996),  Clarida  and Gertler  (1997),  Mishkin  and Posen  (1997)  and
Bernanke  and Mihov  (1997).
5Germany's monetary-targeting regime was successful in producing low inflation and its
success has been envied by many other countries, explaining why it was chosen as the anchor
country for the Exchange Rate Mechanism. One clear indication of Germany's success occurred
in  the aftermath of  German reunification in  1990.  Despite a  temporary  surge in  inflation
stemming from the terms of reunification, high wage demands, and the fiscal expansion, the
Bundesbank was able to keep these temporary effects from becoming embedded in the inflation
process, and by 1995, inflation fell back down below the Bundesbank's normative inflation goal
of 2%.
Monetary  targeting  in  Switzerland  has  been  more  problematic  than  in  Germany,
suggesting the difficulties of targeting monetary aggregates in a small open economy which also
underwent substantial changes in the institutional structure of its money markets.  In the face
of a 40% trade-weighted appreciation of the Swiss franc from the fall of  1977 to  the fall of
1978, the Swiss National Bank decided that the country could not tolerate this high a level of
the exchange rate.  Thus,  in the fall of  1978 the monetary targeting regime was abandoned
temporarily, with a shift from a monetary target to an exchange-rate target until the spring of
1979, when monetary targeting was reintroduced although it was not announced.
The period from  1989 to 1992 was also not a happy one for Swiss monetary targeting
because Swiss National  Bank  failed to  maintain price  stability after it successfully reduced
inflation (e.g., see  Rich,  1997). The substantial overshoot  of  inflation from  1989 to  1992,
reaching levels above 5%, was due to two factors.  The first was that the strength of the Swiss
franc from 1985 to 1987 caused the Swiss National Bank to allow the monetary base to grow
at a rate greater than the 2% target in 1987 and then caused it to raise the money-growth target
to 3% for 1988.  The second arose from the introduction of a new interbank payment system,
Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC), and a wide-ranging revision of the commercial banks' liquidity
requirements in 1988. The result of the shocks to the exchange rate and the shift in the demand
for monetary base arising from the above institutional changes created a serious problem for its
targeted aggregate.  As the  1988 year unfolded, it became clear that the Swiss National Bank
had guessed wrong in predicting the effects of these shocks so that monetary policy was too
easy even though the  monetary target was undershot.  The result was a  subsequent rise  in
inflation to above the 5% level.
As  a result of these problems with monetary  targeting Switzerland was  substantially
loosened its monetary targeting regime.  The Swiss National Bank recognized that its money-
growth targets were of diminished utility as a means of signaling the direction of monetary
policy.  Thus, its announcement at the end of  1990 of the medium-term growth path did not
specify a horizon for the target or the starting point of the growth path.  At the end of 1992 the
6Bank specified the starting point for the expansion path and at the end of 1994, it announced a
new medium-term path  for money base  growth for the period 1995 to  1999.  By setting this
path, the Bank revealed retroactively that the horizon of the first path was also five years (1990-
95).  Clearly, the Swiss National Bank moved to a much more flexible framework in which
hitting one-year targets for money base growth was abandoned. Nevertheless, Swiss monetary
policy continued to be successful in controlling inflation, with inflation rates falling back down
below the 1% level after the temporary bulge in inflation from 1989-1992.  In 1999, the Swiss




THE MONETARY TARGETING  EXPERIENCE
There are three basic lessons to be learned from our discussion of monetary targeting in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Switzerland.
The  Instability  of  the  Relationship  Between  Monetary  Aggregates  and  Goal
Variables  (inflation and nominal income) MakeMonetary  TargetingProblematic.
As we have seen from the experience with monetary targeting described above, the relationship
between monetary aggregates and goal variables such as inflation is often very unstable.  As a
result, monetary targeting has either been downplayed or abandoned (as in the United States,
the United Kingdom and Canada), or alternatively when followed too closely has led to some
serious policy  mistakes  (as  in  Switzerland).  Even in  Germany, the  relationship between
monetary aggregates and nominal income and inflation has not been very close (e.g., Estrella
and Mishkin, 1997) and this helps explain why the Bundesbank was willing to miss its target
ranges half the time.  A similar problem of instability of the money-inflation relationship has
been  found  in  emerging market  countries,  such  as  those  in  Latin  America  (Mishkin  and
Savastano, 2000.)
The  weak relationship  between  money  and  nominal  income  implies  that  hitting  a
monetary target will not  produce the desired outcome for a  goal variable such as inflation.
Furthermore, the monetary aggregate will no longer provide an adequate signal about the stance
of monetary policy.  Thus,  except under very unusual circumstances, monetary targeting will
7not help fix inflation expectations and be a good guide for assessing the accountability of the
central bank.  In addition,  an  unreliable relationship between monetary aggregates and goal
variables makes it difficult for monetary targeting to serve as  a communications device that
increases the transparency of monetary policy and makes the central bank accountable to the
public.
The  Key  to  Success  for  Monetary  Targeting  is  an  Active  Engagement  in
Communication which Enhances  Transparency andAccountability  ofthe Central
Bank.  The experience of Germany and Switzerland shows monetary targeting can be used
successfully if it is actively used to clearly communicate a long-run strategy of inflation control.
Both central banks in these two countries used monetary targeting to clearly state the objectives
of monetary policy  and  to  explain that  policy actions remained  focused on  long-run price
stability when  targets  were  missed.  The  active  communication  with  the  public  by  the
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank increased transparency and accountability of these
central banks.  In contrast, the game playing which was a feature of monetary targeting in the
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada hindered the communication process so that
transparency and accountability of the central banks in these countries was not enhanced.
Because explanations of target misses are necessarily complicated, monetary targeting
will only be effective for inflation control if the public is sophisticated about monetary matters
and holds the central bank in such high regard that it trusts their explanations.  Switzerland and
especially Gerrnany satisfy these conditions, because the public cares so much about avoiding
high inflation and because of the excellent track record of their central banks in preventing high
inflation.  However, very  few other countries have these characteristics that made monetary
targeting work for Germany and Switzerland, and this is why I have argued in Mishkin (1999)
against the use of monetary aggregates as a key "pillar" in the monetary policy strategy of the
European  Central Bank.  Given  the  low  credibility  of  central  banks  in  emerging  market
countries, there is an even stronger case that monetary targeting is unlikely to produce good
outcomes for these countries.
Monetary Targeting Has Been Very  Flexible in Practice and a Rigid Approach Has
Not Been Necessary to Obtain Good  Inflation  Outcomes.  The case  studies  above  show
that all monetary targeters have been quite flexible in their approach and have not come even
close to following a rigid rule.  All have shown that they have objectives over and above price
8stability, such as concerns about the exchange rate, financial instability and output fluctuations.
Despite a flexible approach to monetary targeting which included tolerating target misses and
gradual disinflation, Gennany  and Switzerland have demonstrated that flexibility is consistent
with successful inflation control.  The key to success has been seriousness about pursuing the
long-run goal of price stability and actively engaging public support for this task.
As we see in the next  section, these key elements of a successful targeting regime --
flexibility, transparency and accountability - are also important elements in inflation-targeting
regimes.  I would argue that  German and Swiss monetary policy was actually far closer in
practice to inflation targeting than it is to Friedman-like monetary targeting, and thus might best
be thought of as "hybrid" inflation targeting.  This is why it was so natural for Switzerland to
move toward an inflation targeting regime recently and why the European Central Bank has
placed an inflation goal of 0 to 2% as a central pillar of their monetary policy strategy.
IV.
INFLATION TARGETING:
EXPERIENCE  IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Inflation targeting involves five key elements:  1) public announcement of medium-term
numerical targets for inflation;  2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary,
long-run goal of  monetary  policy and  a  commitment to  achieve  the  inflation  goal;  3)  an
information inclusive strategy in which many variables and not just  monetary aggregates are
used in making decisions about monetary policy; 4) increased transparency of  the monetary
policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about the plans  and
objectives of monetary policymakers; and 5) increased accountability of the central bank  for
attaining its inflation objectives.
With the problems encountered with monetary targeting in the 1970s and 80s, inflation
targeting was adopted in a number of industrialized countries in the 1990s, starting with New
Zealand in 1990, with Canada following in February 1991, Israel in December 1991, the United
Kingdom in 1992, Sweden and Finland in 1993, Australia in 1994 and Spain in 1994. The case
studies  focus  on  New  Zealand,  Australia,  Canada  and  the  United Kingdom,  from  whose
9experience the key lessons follow. 7
New Zealand and Australia
After bringing inflation down from almost 17% in  1985 to the vicinity of 5% by 1989, the
New Zealand parliament passed a new Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act in 1989, that became
effective on February 1, 1990. Besides increasing the independence of the central bank, moving
it  from being  one  of  the  least  independent  to  one  of  the  most  independent  among the
industrialized countries, the act also committed the Reserve Bank to a sole objective of price
stability. The act stipulated that the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank
should negotiate and make public a Policy Targets Agreement which  sets out  the targets by
which monetary policy performance would be  evaluated.  These agreements have  specified
numerical target ranges  for inflation and the dates by which they were  to  be  reached.  An
unusual feature of the New Zealand legislation is that the Governor of the Reserve Bank is held
highly accountable for the success of monetary policy.  If the goals  set  forth  in the Policy
Targets Agreement are not satisfied, the Governor is subject to dismissal.
The first Policy Targets Agreement, signed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor
of the Reserve Bank on March 2, 1990, directed the Reserve Bank to achieve an annual inflation
rate of 3 to 5% by the end of 1990 with a gradual reduction in subsequent years to a 0 to 2%
range by 1992 (changed to  1993), which was kept until the end of 1996 when the range was
changed to 0-3%. As a result of tight monetary policy, the inflation rate was brought down from
above 5% to below 2% by the end of 1992, but at the cost of a deep recession and a sharp rise
in unemployment. From 1992 to 1996, New Zealand's inflation remained low, the growth rate
was very high, with some years exceeding 5%, and unemployment came down significantly.
Like Germany's monetary targeting regime, New Zealand's inflation targeting regime
had a fair degree of flexibility built in.  First, as we have seen above, the target range was
lowered gradually to the long-run price stability goal.  As Svensson (1997) had shown, a gradual
movement of the inflation target toward the long-run, price-stability goal indicates that output
fluctuations are a concern (in the objective function) of monetary policy.  Second, the Reserve
Bank emphasized that the floor of the range should be as binding a commitment as the floor,
7Further  details  on the inflation  targeting  experience  in industrialized  countries  can  be found  in
Leiderman  and Svensson  (1995), Mishkin  and Posen (1997), Bemanke, Laubach, Mishkin  and Posen
(1999).
10indicating that it cared about output fluctuations as well as inflation. As a result it acted to ease
monetary policy as early as September 1991 in order to prevent inflation from falling below the
target range.  Third, the regime has escape clauses to allow the Reserve Bank to accommodate
specific shocks to  inflation  including significant changes in  the terms  of  trade, changes in
indirect taxes that affect the price level, and supply shocks such as a major livestock epidemic.
Despite the  flexibility  in New  Zealand's inflation targeting regime,  there were rigid
elements: the one-year horizon for its inflation target, the initial narrow range of its target, and
the potential dire penalty  for the Governor if  inflation breached the target by even a small
amount.  These rigid elements led to two serious problems:  1) controllability, i.e., the difficulty
in keeping inflation within a narrow target range, and 2) instrument instability, i.e., occasional
wide swings in the instruments of monetary policy, interest rates and exchange rates.  In 1995,
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand overshot its one-year-horizon inflation target range by a few
tenths of a percentage point, making the governor subject to dismissal under the central banking
law.  It was recognized in the Reserve Bank that the overshoot was likely to be short-lived and
inflation was likely to  fall, indicating that monetary policy had not been overly expansionary.
Fortunately, this  view was  accepted outside the Bank  and the governor, Don Brash, whose
performance was excellent, retained his job.
Attempting to hit the annual target did, however, have the unfortunate consequence of
producing excessive swings in the monetary policy instruments, especially the exchange rate.
In a small, open economy, like New Zealand, exchange rate movements have a faster impact
on inflation than interest rates. Thus trying to achieve annual inflation targets required heavier
reliance on manipulating exchange rates which led to large swings.  By trying to hit the short-
horizon target, the  Reserve  Bank  also may  have induced  greater output  fluctuations.  For
example, the Reserve Bank pursued overly tight monetary policy at the end of 1996 with the
overnight cash rate going to  10% because of  fears that inflation would rise above the target
range in 1997. This helped lead to an undesirable decline in output.
The focus on the exchange rate led to its further institutionalization by the Reserve Bank
which early in 1997 adopted as its primary indicator of monetary policy a Monetary Conditions
Index (MCI) similar to that developed originally by the Bank of Canada.  The idea behind the
MCI, which is a weighted average of the exchange rate and a short-term interest rate, is that
both interest rates and exchange rates on average have offsetting impacts on inflation.  When
the exchange rate falls, this usually leads to higher inflation in the future, and so interest rates
need to rise to offset the upward pressure on inflation.
The problem with  the  MCI concept is that the offsetting effects of interest rates and
exchange rates on inflation depend on the nature of the shocks to the exchange rates.  If the
11exchange rate depreciation comes from portfolio considerations, then it does lead to  higher
inflation and needs to be offset by an interest rate rise.  On the other hand, if the reason for the
exchange rate depreciation is  a  real shock, such as  a negative terms of trade  shock which
decreases the demand  for  a  country's exports, then the situation  is entirely  different.  The
negative terms of trade shock reduces aggregate demand and is likely to be deflationary.  The
correct interest rate response is then a decline in interest rates, not a rise as the MCI suggests.
With the negative terms of trade shock in 1997, the adoption of the MCI in 1997 led to
exactly the wrong monetary policy response to East Asian crisis.  With depreciation setting in
afler the crisis began in July 1997 after the devaluation of the Thai baht, the MCI began a sharp
decline, indicating that the Reserve Bank needed to raise interest rates, which it did by over 200
basis points.  The result was very tight monetary policy, with the ovemight cash rate exceeding
9% by June of 1998. Because the depreciation was due to a substantial, negative terms of trade
shock which decreased aggregate demand, the tightening of monetary policy, not surprisingly,
led to a severe recession and an undershoot of the inflation target range with actual deflation
occurring in  1999.8 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand did eventually realize its mistake and
reversed course, sharply lowering interest rates beginning in July  1998 after the economy had
entered a recession,  but by then it was too late.
In contrast to New Zealand, Australia did not pass legislation mandating an inflation
targeting regime.  Instead it eased into a monetary policy regime  with the Governor of  the
Reserve Bank mentioning in a March 1993 speech that achieving an inflation rate of 2 to 3%
on average over a couple of years would be a good outcome, with a more formal commitment
in September 1994 to an inflation goal (later upgraded to "target") of 2 to 3% "over a run of
years" (Fraser, 1994).  Also, in contrast to New Zealand, the Australian version of inflation
targeting stressed flexibility in all aspects of its operations, from the definition of the target with
its  "thick point" target to  the recognition of its  discretion in  responding to  shocks.  Supply
shocks are dealt with directly by exclusion of food and energy prices from the targeted price
index, while the Reserve Bank has indicated that it will only return inflation gradually to the 2
to 3% level following a shock to the price level. (Stevens and Debelle, 1995).  On the other
hand,  like New Zealand, Australia adopted inflation targeting only  after having  achieved a
substantial disinflation, from an inflation rate near 10% in the mid 1980s to near the 2% level
by the early 1990s.
8The  terms  of trade  shock,  however,  was  not the only negative  shock  the New  Zealand  economy  faced
during  that period. Its farm  sector  experienced  a severe  drought  which  also hurt the economy.  Thus,  a
mistake  in monetary  policy  was not the only  source  of the recession. Bad luck  played  a role  too. See
Drew  and Orr (1999)  and Brash (2000).
12The more flexible approach to inflation targeting in Australia has been quite successful
with inflation near the 2 to 3% target since the inception of the targeting regime.  Particularly
striking is how well monetary policy performed in response to the East Asian crisis of  1997.
Prior to adoption of their inflation targeting regime in 1994, the Reserve Bank of Australia had
adopted a policy of allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate without interference, particularly if
the source of the exchange rate change was a real shock, like a termns  of trade shock. Thus when
faced with the devaluation in Thailand in July 1997, the Reserve Bank recognized that it faced
a substantial negative termns  of trade shock because of the large component of its foreign trade
conducted with the Asian region and that it should not fight the depreciation of the Australian
dollar that would inevitably result. 9 Thus in contrast to New Zealand, it immediately lowered
the overnight cash rate by 50 basis points to 5% and kept it near at this level until the end of
1998, when it was lowered again by another 25 basis points.
Indeed, the adoption of the inflation targeting regime probably helped the Reserve Bank
of Australia to be even more aggressive in its easing in response to the East Asian crisis and
helps explain why their response was so rapid.  The Reserve Bank was able to make clear that
easing was exactly what inflation targeting called for in order to prevent an undershooting of
the target, so that the easing was unlikely to have an adverse effect on inflation expectations.
The outcome of the Reserve Bank's policy actions was extremely favorable.  In contrast to New
Zealand, real output growth remained strong throughout this period.  Furthermore, there were
no negative consequences for inflation despite the  substantial depreciation of the Australian
dollar against the U.S. dollar by close to 20%: inflation remained under control, actually falling
during this period to end up slightly under the target range of 2 to 3%.
Given the problems it encountered in  1997 and  1998 as a result of  its  focus on the
exchange rate and the rigidity  of its regime relative to Australia's, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand has  modified  its  regime  to  have more  in  common with  the  Australians.  It  has
recognized the problems it had with a too short target horizon and now emphasizes a horizon
of six to eight quarters in their discussions of monetary policy.'"  Furthermore, the Policy Target
Agreement between the central bank and the government has recently been amended to be more
flexible in order to support the longer policy horizon."  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has
also recognized the problems  with using  an  MCI as  an  indicator of  monetary policy  and
9See  McFarlane  (1999)  and Stevens  (1999).
'0See Sherwin  (1999)  and Drew  and Orr  (1999).
"See Reserve  Bank  of New Zealand  (2000).
13abandoned it in 1999.  Now the Reserve Bank operates monetary policy in a more conventional
way, using  the overnight  cash  rate as  its policy  instrument, with  far less  emphasis  on the
exchange rate in its monetary policy decisions.  Recently, the Reserve Bank has also modified
its discussion of the inflation target to put greater emphasis on the midpoint of the target rather
than the upper and lower limits of the range.
Canada
As in New Zealand and Australia, Canada adopted inflation targeting only after it had
already achieved a substantial deflation, bringing it down from above the 10% level to just over
4% by the end of  1990.  As in Australia, inflation targeting was not the result of legislation.
However, in contrast to Australia, the inflation target is jointly determined and announced by
the government and  the central bank.  On February 26,  1991, a joint  announcement by the
Minister of  Finance  and  the  Govemnor  of  the  Bank of  Canada established  formal inflation
targets.  The target ranges were 2-4% by the end of 1992, 1.5-3.5% by June 1994 and 1-3% by
December 1995.  After a new government took office in late 1993, the target range was set at
1-3% from December 1995 until December 1998 and has remained at this level since then.
An important challenge to the success of the inflation target at its  inception was the
federal government's introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) which was accompanied
by increases in other direct taxes by both the federal and provincial governnents.  Indeed, an
important reason why the government advocated the inflation target was its hope that it would
moderate public sector wage demands in the face of the indirect tax increases and help keep the
effect of these taxes to  a  one-time increase in the price level rather than a ratcheting up of
inflation.  In  this regard,  the adoption of  inflation targeting was quite  successful,  with  the
upward blip in inflation in  1991 to 5% followed by a decline to a 0% rate in 1995, well below
the target range of  1-3%.  However, as was the case in New Zealand, this decline was not
without cost:  unemployment soared to above the 10% level from 1991 until 1994.  Since 1995,
unemployment has fallen to below 7% and the regime has been successful in keeping inflation
within the target range of 1-3%.
Inflation targeting in Canada is quite flexible in practice and is closer to the approach in
Australia than it is to that in New Zealand.  The Bank of Canada is not directly accountable to
the govermnent via formal sanctions if it misses its targets as in New Zealand, but rather like
the Reserve Bank of Australia is accountable to the public in general.  In addition, the inflation
14targeting regime building in a gradual reduction the of inflation target at its inception, explicitly
acknowledging of the long lags between monetary policy and inflation outcomes.  It did this by
setting the horizon for the first target to be 22 months in the future, and a focus on underlying
trend of inflation as well as on the headline CPI inflation. Furthermore, the Bank of Canada has
stressed that it is concerned  about output fluctuations as well as about  inflation.  While all
inflation-targeting regimes in industrialized countries have put a  floor as well as a ceiling on
inflation targets, this feature has been more prominent and explicit in the Canadian framework.
Gordon Thiessen, the governor of the Bank of Canada since 1993, has emphasized this often
in his speeches, as suggested by the following quotation:
Some people  fear that  by  focusing monetary policy tightly  on  inflation control, the
monetary authorities may be neglecting economic activity and employment.  Nothing
could be further from the truth.  By keeping inflation within a target range, monetary
policy acts as a stabilizer for the economy.  When weakening demand threatens to pull
inflation below the target range, it will be countered by a monetary easing. (Thiessen,
1996, p. 2)
One distinguishing feature of the Canadian framework has been the Bank of Canada's
development of the MCI concept and its use as a guide to the conduct of monetary policy.  A
change in the MCI is defined as the weighted sum of changes in the ninety-day commercial
paper interest rate and the trade-weighted exchange rate, with a three-to-one weighting on the
interest rate relative to the exchanger rate.  The MCI has been used to remind the public (and
those inside the Bank) that not  only is there an interest rate channel for the transmission of
monetary policy, but the exchange rate is also an important channel in small open economies
like Canada's and thus must be taken into account when setting interest rates.  Although the MCI
has been useful in this context, recently the Bank of Canada has been backing away from this
concept.  Deputy Governor Charles Freedman has recently argued in  Freedman (2000) that
recent shocks to the exchange rate have had quite different sources than during the period for
which the MCI weights were estimated, making the MCI a less reliable guide for the stance of
monetary policy.
United Kingdom
After the  United Kingdom  was  forced to  leave  the  European  Monetary  System  after  the
15speculative attack on the pound  in September  1992, the British decided to  turn to  inflation
targets as their nominal anchor instead of the exchange rate.  Prior to 1997, the Bank of England
did  not have statutory authority  over monetary policy; it could  only make recommendations
about monetary policy.  Thus  it was the Chancellor of  the Exchequer who  announced an
inflation target for the U.K. on October 8, 1992.  Three weeks later he "invited" the Governor
of the Bank of England to begin producing an Inflation Report on a regular quarterly basis which
would report on the progress  being made in  achieving the target;  an  invitation which  the
Governor accepted.  The inflation target range was set at 1-4% until the next election, Spring
1997 at the latest, with the intent that the inflation rate should settle down to the lower half of
the range (below 2.5%).  In May 1997 after the new Labour government came into power, it
adopted a point target of 2.5% for inflation and gave the Bank of England the power to set
interest rates henceforth, granting it a more independent  role in monetary policy.
The decision to move to a point target of 2.5%, reflected problems with the 1-4% range
that manifested itself in mid-1995.  In the May 5 meeting of the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and the Governor of the Bank  of England, the Chancellor overruled the Governor's advice to
raise interest rates even though inflation was in the upper half of the range, and was forecast to
rise further by the Bank  and ended up exceeding the 2.5% midpoint by over one percentage
point.  In a speech on June  14 (Clarke, 1995), the Chancellor created some confusion about
whether meeting the target meant keeping it below 4% or below the 2.5% target set by him and
his predecessor.  As in New Zealand, the edges of the target range had taken on a life of their
own, making it less likely that monetary policy would focus on the target midpoint.  To prevent
this from occurring again, the point target of 2.5% was adopted in 1997.
Before the adoption of inflation targets, inflation had  already been falling in the U.K.
from a peak of 9% at the beginning of  1991 to 4% at the time  of adoption.  The inflation
targeting regime was able  to  contain inflation after the shock  of the British devaluation in
September 1992. After a small upward movement in early 1993, inflation continued to fall until
by the  third quarter of  1994, it was at 2.2%,  within the intended  range articulated by  the
Chancellor.  Subsequently inflation rose,  climbing above  the  2.5%  level by  1996 but  has
remained around the 2.5% target since then. Meanwhile growth of the U.K. economy has been
strong, causing a reduction in the unemployment rate.
The British inflation  targeting regime is  similar  in  flexibility  to  the  Canadian  and
Australian frameworks.  It also has stressed a gradual approach to the long-run inflation goal,
a focus on the underlying trend  of inflation rather than on the headline CPI inflation, and a
commitment to preventing declines in inflation below the target.  An unusual feature of the
British regime up until 1997 was that control over the setting of the monetary policy instruments
16lay with the government as represented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer instead of with the
central bank.  One manifestation of this lack of independence to conduct monetary policy of the
Bank of England was that it focused on refining its communication with the public so that it
could effectively act as the "counterinflationary  conscience" for the government.  With necessity
being the mother of all inventions, the Bank of England set a standard with its quarterly Inflation
Report, and with the third report in August 1993 was sent to the Treasury only after its contents
had been finalized and printed, so that the Treasury would not have the opportunity to edit or
suggest changes.  This report was designed to bring increased transparency and accountability
to monetary policy by providing a measure of performance relative to the inflation target, and
by articulating how current economic circumstances and monetary conditions would be likely
to affect future inflation. The style of the Inflation Report is particularly noteworthy because it
departed  from the usual,  dull-looking,  formal reports  of  central banks  to  take  on  the best
elements of textbook writing (fancy graphics, use of boxes) in order to better communicate with
the public.  Because of  its  success in  getting out  the central bank's  message,  the Bank of
England's Inflation Report has been widely emulated by other inflation targeting countries.
The success of the inflation targeting framework in the United Kingdom, which can be
attributed to the Bank of England's focus on transparency and communication, helped lead to
the Bank being granted operational independence to  set monetary policy instruments on May
6, 1997.  On May 6, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced that the
Bank of England would henceforth have the responsibility for setting both the base interest rate
and short-term exchange-rate interventions.  Two factors were cited by Chancellor Brown that
justified the government's decision:  first was the Bank's successful performance over time as
measured against an announced  clear target; second was the increased accountability that an
independent central bank  is  exposed to  under  an  inflation-targeting framework, making the
Bank more responsive to political oversight.  The granting of operational independence to the
Bank of England occurred because it would now be operating under a monetary policy regime
that ensured that monetary  policy goals  could not  diverge from  the interests of  society  for




INFLATION TARGETING  EXPERIENCE
Here  we  draw  lessons  from the experience with  inflation targeting  in  industrialized
countries which can be grouped under three categories: 1) the success of inflation targeting, 2)
transparency and accountability, and 3) the operational design of inflation targeting.
Has Inflation Targeting  Been a Success?
The simple answer to this question is generally yes, with some qualifications,  We look
at how well inflation targeting has done along the following dimensions.
Inflation Targeting  Has Been Successful in Controlling  Inflation. The performance
of inflation targeting regimes has been quite good.  Inflation-targeting countries have been able
to  significantly reduce  the  inflation rate  from  what might  have  been  expected  given past
experience.  Bemanke,  Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), for example, find  that inflation
remained lower after inflation targeting than would have been forecast using VARs estimated
with data from the period before inflation targeting started.  Furtherrnore, once inflation was
reduced to levels consistent with price stability, it has remained low:  following disinflations,
the inflation rate in targeting countries has  not bounced back up during subsequent cyclical
expansions of the economy.
Inflation  Targeting Weakens the Effects of Inflationary Shocks.  As discussed above,
after Canada adopted inflation targets in February  1991, the regime was challenged by a new
goods and services tax (GST), an adverse supply shock that in earlier periods might have led
to a ratcheting up in inflation.  Instead the tax increase led to only a one-time increase in the
price level; it did not generate second- and third-round rises in wages in prices that would led
to  a  persistent rise  in  the inflation rate.  Another example is the  experience of the United
Kingdom and Sweden following their departures from the ERM exchange-rate pegs in  1992.
In both cases, devaluation would normally have stimulated inflation because of the direct effects
on higher export and import prices and  the subsequent effects on wage demands and price-
setting behavior.  Again  it seems reasonable to  attribute the lack of inflationary response in
18these episodes to adoption of inflation targeting, which short-circuited the second- and later-
round effects and helped to focus public attention on the temporary nature of the devaluation
shocks.  Indeed, one reason why inflation targets were adopted in both countries was to achieve
exactly this result.
Inflation Targeting Can Promote Growth and Does Not Lead to Increased Outplut
Fluctuations.  Although inflation reduction has been associated with below-normal output
during  disinflationary phases  in  inflation-targeting regimes, once  low  inflation  levels  were
achieved, output and employment returned to levels as high as they were previously and output
fluctuations are no higher. A conservative conclusion is that once low inflation is achieved,
inflation targeting is not harmful to the real economy.  Given the strong economic growth after
disinflation in many countries that have adopted inflation targeting such as those discussed in
the case studies, a case can be made that inflation targeting promotes real economic growth in
addition to controlling inflation.
Inflation Targets  Do Not Necessarily Reduce the Cost of Reducing Inflation. One
of the hopes of the industrialized countries who adopted inflation targets when there was still
the need to disinflate was that a commitment by a central bank to reduce and control inflation
would improve its credibility and thereby reduce both  inflation expectations and the output
losses associated with disinflation.  Experience and econometric evidence (e.g., see  Almeida
and Goodhart, 1998, Laubach and Posen, 1997, Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999)
does not  support this prediction, however.  Inflation expectations did not immediately adjust
downward following the adoption of inflation targeting.  Furthermore, there appears to have
been little if any reduction in the output loss associated with disinflation, the sacrifice ratio,
among countries adopting inflation targeting.  It appears, unfortunately, that there is no  free
(credibility) lunch from inflation targeting.  The only way to achieve disinflation is the hard
way:  by inducing short-run losses in output and employment in order to achieve the longer-run
economic benefits of price stability.
Transparency and Accountability
Transparency and accountability are key features of inflation targeting, leading to  the
following lessons.
19The Key to Success  of Inflation  Targeting is It's  Stress  on  Transparency and
Communication with the Public. A key feature of all inflation targeting regimes is that they
put  enormous stress  on  transparency and  communication.  The  Inflation Report  document
published by the Bank of England and its counterpart documents from other inflation-targeting
central banks is one example mentioned in the case studies.  Inflation-targeting central banks
take this communication with the public even further.  Officials of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, particularly the Govemor, Don Brash, pride themselves on their extensive speaking
schedule (and even glossy brochures) which are used to  explain to  all walks of society the
conduct of monetary policy  under  the  inflation targeting regime.  Other  inflation-targeting
central banks use similar  methods.  Furthermore, inflation-targeting central banks engage in
additional forms of  communication which  increases  transparency  including:  testimony  to
national parliaments, release of minutes of the meetings of the monetary policy committees who
decide on  monetary policy,  release of  central bank  forecasts of  inflation  and  output,  and
numerous articles in official central bank publications and elsewhere to explain the conduct of
monetary policy.
The above channels of communication are used by central banks in inflation-targeting
countries to explain the following to the general public, financial market participants and the
politicians: 1) the goals and limitations of monetary policy, including the rationale for inflation
targets; 2) the numerical values of the inflation targets and how they were determined, 3) how
the inflation targets are to be achieved, given current economic conditions; and 4) reasons for
any deviations from targets.  These communication efforts have been crucial to the success of
the  inflation targeting regimes.  They have  improved private-sector  planning  by  reducing
uncertainty about monetary  policy,  interest  rates  and  inflation;  they have  promoted public
debate of monetary policy, in part by educating the public about what a central bank can and
cannot achieve; they have  increased the  central banks'  freedom  of  action,  for example  by
allowing central banks to more readily pursue expansionary monetary policy when faced with
negative shocks to the economy without adverse effects on inflation expectations; and they have
helped  clarify the responsibilities of  the  central bank  and  of  politicians  in  the  conduct of
monetary policy.
Inflation  Targeting Increases Accountability  Which Helps Ameliorate  the Time-
Inconsistency  Problem.  An  important consequence  of  increased  communication  and
transparency is that it promotes accountability of the central bank and thus can help reduce the
likelihood that the central bank will fall into the time-inconsistency trap in which it tries to
20expand output and  employment in  the short-run by pursuing  overly expansionary monetary
policy.  But since time-inconsistency is more  likely to  come from political pressures on the
central bank to  engage in  overly expansionary monetary policy, a key advantage of inflation
targeting is that it helps focus the political debate on what a central bank can do in the long-run
-- that is, control inflation -- rather than what it cannot do -- raise economic growth and the
number of jobs permanently through expansionary monetary policy.  Thus inflation targeting
has  the potential  to  reduce  political pressures on  the  central bank  to  pursue inflationary
monetary policy and thereby reduce the likelihood of time-inconsistent  policymaking.
Indeed, in countries which have adopted inflation targeting, the public debate has shifted
from short-run considerations with a focus on "jobs, jobs, jobs", to a longer-run focus on what
the  long-run inflation  goal  should be  and  whether  the  current  setting  of monetary  policy
instruments is  appropriate to  achieve the  stated  inflation target.  This  change in  political
economy of monetary policymaking in inflation targeting countries is one of the key reasons
why central banks have been able to pursue policies that have kept inflation low.
Increased  Transparency  and Accountability  Under Inflation  Targeting Helps
Promote  Central Bank  Independence.  A key  factor behind the success of  inflation
targeting is that it helps promote independence of central banks, thus enabling them to take a
longer-run view and avoid the time-inconsistency pressures from politicians.  Sustained success
in the conduct of monetary  policy, as measured against a well defined benchmark, inflation
targets, has been instrumental in building public support for a central bank's independence and
policies.  We have  already  seen how inflation targeting in  the United  Kingdom led to  the
government's granting  it  operational  independence  to  conduct  monetary  policy.  Another
remarkable example occurred in Canada in 1996, when the president of the Canadian Economic
Association made a speech criticizing the Bank of Canada for pursuing monetary policy that he
claimed was too  contractionary.  His  speech sparked  off  a  widespread public  debate.  In
countries not  pursuing  inflation  targeting, such  debates often  degenerate into  calls  for the
immediate expansion of monetary policy with little reference to the long-run consequences of
such a policy change.  In this case, however, the very existence of inflation targeting channeled
the debate into a substantive discussion over what should be the appropriate target for inflation,
with both the Bank and its critics obliged to make explicit their assumptions and estimates of
the costs and benefits  of  different levels of  inflation.  Indeed, the debate and  the Bank  of
Canada's record and responsiveness led to increased support for the Bank of Canada, with the
result that criticism of the Bank and its conduct of monetary policy was not a major issue in the
211997 elections as it had been before the 1993 elections.
Accountability  to  the  General  Public  Seems  to  Work  as  Well  as  Direct
Accountability to the Government.  The strongest form of accountability of a central bank
in  an  inflation-targeting regime  is in New  Zealand, where the government has the  right to
dismiss the Reserve Bank's governor if the inflation targets are breached.  As we have seen, in
other inflation-targeting countries, the central bank's accountability is less  formalized.  Still,
transparency of policy associated with inflation targeting has tended to make the central bank
highly accountable to both  the general public  and the government, with the benefits outlined
above.  Indeed, central banks with a less formal approach to accountability, such as Australia,
Canada and the United Kingdom, have done as well in controlling inflation as New Zealand
with its more formal approach.
Inflation Targeting is Consistent with Democratic Principles. As discussed in Mishkin
(1999b), inflation targeting has the virtue of being fully consistent with the role of a central bank
in a democratic society.  Though a central bank is most effective if it is insulated from short-
term political pressures, democratic principles suggest that it be accountable over the longer-
termn  to the political process for achieving goals set by the government.  In the terminology of
Debelle  and  Fischer  (1994)  and  Fischer  (1994),  the central bank  would  be  goal,  but  not
instrument independent.  When the goals of monetary policy and the central bank's record for
achieving them are laid out clearly as in an inflation targeting regime, it becomes difficult for
the central bank to pursue for any extended period of time policies that are inconsistent with the
interests of the society at large.
Operational Design of Inflation Targeting
There are several elements of operational design that have important implications for
how inflation targeting has worked in practice.
Inflation  Targeting is Far From a Rigid Rule.  Some economists (e.g. Friedman and
Kutner, 1996) have criticized inflation targeting because they believe that it imposes a rigid rule
on monetary policymakers that does not allow them enough discretion to respond to unforeseen
circumstances.  This criticism is one that has featured prominently in the rules-versus-discretion
22debate.  For example, as we have seen in the case studies on monetary targeting, policymakers
in countries that adopted monetary targeting did not foresee the breakdown of the relationship
between monetary aggregates and goal variables such as nominal spending or inflation.  With
rigid adherence to  a  monetary  rule,  the  breakdown in  their  relationship  could  have been
disastrous.  However, the traditional  distinction between rules and  discretion can be highly
misleading.  Useful policy  strategies exist that are "rule-like" in  that they involve forward-
looking  behavior  that  limits  policymakers  from  systematically engaging  in  policies  with
undesirable long-run consequences.  Such policies avoid the time-inconsistency problem and
would best be described as "constrained discretion" (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997).
Indeed, inflation targeting can be described exactly in this way.  As we have seen in the
case studies, inflation targeting, as actually practiced, is far from a rigid rule.  First, inflation
targeting does not provide simple and mechanical instructions as to how the central bank should
conduct monetary policy.  Rather,  inflation targeting requires that  the  central bank  use  all
available  information to  determine  what  are  the appropriate policy  actions  to  achieve the
inflation target.  Unlike simple policy rules, inflation targeting never requires the central bank
to  ignore information and  focus solely on  one key variable.  Second,  inflation targeting as
practiced contains a substantial degree of policy discretion. Inflation targets have been modified
depending on economic circumstances, as we have seen.  Furthermore,  central banks under
inflation-targeting regimes have left themselves considerable scope to respond to output growth
and fluctuations through several devices.
However, despite its flexibility, it is important to recall that inflation targeting is not an
exercise  in policy discretion  as  subject to  the time-inconsistency problem.  The strategy of
hitting an inflation target, by its very nature, forces policymakers to be  forward looking rather
than narrowly focused on current economic conditions.  Further, as discussed above, through
its transparency, an inflation-targeting regime increases the central bank's accountability, which
constrains discretion so that the time-inconsistency  problem is ameliorated.
Inflation  Targets Have Always Been Above Zero With No Loss of Credibility. All
inflation targeters in industrialized countries (and hybrid targeters like Germany or the European
Central Bank) have chosen to choose inflation targets well above zero:  the midpoint of long-run
inflation target ranges is 1% for the European Central Bank, 1.5% for New Zealand, 1.75% for
Germany just  before EMU, 2% for Canada, Sweden and Finland (and Spain before it joined
EMU), and 2.5% for Australia and the United Kingdom.  This choice of inflation targets above
zero  reflects  monetary  policymakers  concerns that  too  low  inflation,  or  particularly  low
23inflation,  can  have  substantial  negative  effects  on  real  economic  activity. 12 There  are
particularly valid reasons for fearing deflation, including the possibility that it might promote
financial instability and  precipitate a  severe economic contraction  (see Mishkin,  1991 and
1997). Indeed, deflation has been associated with deep recessions or even depressions, as in the
1930s, and the recent deflation in Japan has been one factor that has weakened the financial
system and the economy. Targeting inflation rates of above zero makes periods of deflation less
Likely.
As  long as inflation targets  are consistent with  Alan Greenspan's definition of price
stability, a rate of price increase such that households and business take little account of it in
everyday decisions, which  I  would put  between  0 and  3%, there appears to  be no  loss of
credibility for the central bank and inflation targeting regimes.  For example, the evidence on
inflation expectations from  surveys and  interest  rate  levels (Almeida  and  Goodhart,  1998,
Laubach and  Posen (1997)  and Bemanke, Laubach, Posen and  Mishkin, 1999) suggest that
maintaining a target for inflation above zero (but not too far above) for an extended period does
not lead to instability in inflation expectations.
Iinflation Targeting Does Not Ignore  Traditional Stabilization Goals.  One concern
or critics of inflation targeting is that an excessive focus on inflation may result in excessive
output fluctuations.  The fact that excessive output fluctuations have not occurred results from
the  fact that inflation targeting central banks cannot be  characterized as  "inflation nutters",
Mervyn King  (1996).  As  outlined in  the case studies,  central banks in  inflation targeting
countries do express their concem about output fluctuations in setting monetary policy, and this
is reflected in the flexibility of the inflation targeting regimes when there are supply shocks, the
gradual convergence of inflation targets to long-run goals (which as demonstrated by Svensson,
1997, indicates a weight on  output in central bank objective functions), and emphasis on the
floor of inflation targets as a rationale for expansionary policy when there are negative shocks
to aggregate demand.  A benefit of  inflation targeting, as it is practiced, is that  it does not
eschew stabilization goals, but rather puts them in the appropriate long-run context.
12For  example.  Akerlof,  Dickens  and Perry  (1996)  argue  that inflation  below  2% can lead to higher
unemployment  because  of downward  rigidities  in wages. However,  as pointed  out in Groshen  and
Schweitzer  (1996),  Akerlof,  Dickens  and Perry  (1996)  do not take  into account  forces  that operate  in the
opposite  direction,  that is, that high and variable  inflation  rates  may increase  the  noise in relative  wages,
reducing  their  information  content  and hence  the efficiency  of the process  by which  workers  are allocated
across occupations and industries.  In other  words,  higher  inflation  can represent  "sand"  as well as
"grease" in the labor market.
24Undershoots of the Inflation  Target are as Important  as  Overshoots.  Inflation
targeters, particularly the Bank of Canada, have emphasized that the floor of the target range
should be  emphasized every bit  as much as  the  ceiling, thus helping to  stabilize the  real
economy when  there  are negative aggregate demand shocks.  Indeed, inflation targets can
increase the flexibility of the central bank to respond to declines in aggregate spending because
declines in aggregate demand that cause the inflation rate to undershoot the target range will
automatically stimulate the central bank to loosen monetary policy without fearing that its action
will trigger a rise in inflation expectations.  Indeed, this feature of inflation targeting was an
important element which helped the Australians to respond so quickly to the negative shock of
the East Asian crisis of 1997, enabling them to weather the storm better than might have been
expected otherwise.  Insufficient focus on undershooting the target would have led to a different
outcome and in general will produce excessive output fluctuations.
Emphasis on  preventing  undershoots of  the  inflation target  range  is  also  important
because it indicates to the public and the politicians that the central bank is not an "inflation
nutter" and cares about output declines, as they do.  The pursuit of price stability implies that
too low inflation is to be avoided as much as too high inflation. Too much focus on preventing
overshoots of the target and not enough emphasis on preventing undershoots can cost a central
bank public support for its policies.  Without this support, political pressure is likely to make
it extremely difficult for the central bank to pursue the price stability objective.
Although the European Central Bank (ECB) has acted to prevent deflation (Issing, 2000)
by easing monetary policy in its first year of operation, its initial announcement of the inflation
goal "of less than 2%" did create some confusion.  Subsequently it clarified that since inflation
always means an increase in the price level, this goal implies a floor of zero on the inflation rate.
Nonetheless, further clarification that the ECB considers the floor of zero for the range on the
inflation goal to be as important as the 2% ceiling would help its communication with the public
and strengthen support for its policies.  Because support for price stability is often more tenuous
in emerging market countries, emphasis on prevention of undershoots of the target is even more
crucial to the success of inflation targeting in these countries."
When Inflation  is Initially  High, Inflation  Targeting May Have to be Phased in
After Disinflation.  When inflation is initially high, inflation is not easily controlled by the
13For  example,  support  for the Central  Bank  of Chile and its inflation  targeting  regime suffered
substantial  erosion  after its recent undershoot  of its target with little comment  from the Chilean  central
bank that undershoots  of the target also need  to be a priority (Mishkin  and Savastano,  2000).
25monetary authorities.  Thus target misses are more likely with an inflation target, and this can
lead to a loss of credibility for the central bank.  This problem is often even more severe for
emerging market countries which have inflation rates well above what has been experienced in
industrialized countries. The solution to this dilemma is to phase in inflation targeting only after
there has been a successful disinflation.  This indeed has been the strategy used by all the
industrialized countries discussed here.  It has also been used by emerging market countries
such as Chile (see Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997,  and Mishkin and Savastano, 2000).
Too Short  a Horizon  and  a Narrow  Range  Can Lead  to  Controllability and
Instrument  Instability Problems.  Monetary policy affects the economy and inflation with
long lags:  for inflation in industrialized countries, the lags are particularly long, estimated to
be on the order of two years.  Shorter time horizons, embedded in annual inflation targets, have
been common  in inflation targeting regimes.  The use of too  short a horizon can lead to a
controllability problem:  too frequent misses of the inflation target, even when monetary policy
is being conducted optimally.  As we have seen, in  1995, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
overshot its  annual inflation target range, making the governor subject to dismissal under the
central bank law even though it was widely recognized that the overshoot was likely to be short-
lived and that inflation would soon fall.  Luckily, this breach of the target range did not result
in a substantial loss of credibility of the Reserve Bank because it was understood that monetary
policy had not been overly expansionary. However, in other circumstances, target breaches due
to too short a horizon for the inflation target could be damaging to central bank credibility and
weaken the effectiveness of the inflation targeting regime.
Too short a horizon can also lead to instrument instability, in which policy instruments
are moved around too much in order to achieve the inflation target over the shorter horizon. As
we have seen, this problem is likely to be even more severe in a small, open economy, like New
Zealand, because exchange rate movements have a faster impact on inflation than interest rates.
As a result, attempts to achieve the annual target will induce greater reliance on manipulating
exchange rates and can lead to large swings.  Indeed, the annual inflation target in New Zealand
is one reason why it may have focused more on  exchange rates in the conduct of monetary
policy, with the negative consequences discussed earlier in the case study.
Trying to hit the short-horizon target can also induce greater output fluctuations.  Recall
that too short a horizon implies that not  enough weight is put  on output fluctuations in the
central bank's objective function as demonstrated by Svensson (1997).  The New Zealand case
study also provided an example of excessive output  fluctuations stemming from too short a
26horizon  when the Reserve Bank  pursued overly tight  monetary policy  at  the end of  1996
because of fears that inflation would rise above the target range in 1997.
A solution to too  short a horizon for the inflation target  is to  set inflation targets for
periods of  two years ahead,  and indeed as we  have seen, New  Zealand has moved in  this
direction. A two-year target  automatically implies that the central bank will have multi-year
targets, because the target for the current year will have been set two years previously.  Only
if  inflation has been at the  long-run price-stability goal will the targets be  the same for the
current year and the following year.  Even in that case, it is important for the central bank to
explain to the public that the target set today is for a period two years from now so that there is
public support for monetary policy to be appropriately  preemptive.
Controllability and  instrument instability problems also can  arise from too  narrow a
target range.  Estimates of the irreducible uncertainty around an inflation target are on the order
of  5 percentage points  (e.g.,  Haldane  and  Salmon,  1995, and  Stevens  and  Debelle,  1995),
although over time success with  inflation targeting might decrease the volatility of inflation
expectations and hence inflation.  To reflect this uncertainty, the inflation targeting central bank
could choose a very wide target range.  However, it is unlikely to do so because a wide range
is likely to confuse the public about the central bank's intentions and reduce the credibility of
policy.  The result is that central bank have chosen target ranges that are so narrow that misses
are likely to be too frequent even with excellent policy.'
4 New Zealand's target misses in the
early years of its inflation-targeting regime can in part be attributed to a too narrow range of 2
percentage points, and although the New Zealand central bank was initially not a supporter of
widening the range to  3 percentage points, this  change has been  an  improvement for their
inflation-targeting framework.
Edges of Target  Range Can Take on a Life of Their Own.  With target ranges in place,
politicians, financial markets and the public often focus on whether inflation is just outside or
inside the edge of the range, rather than the midpoint.  In the New Zealand case, the focus on
small breaches of the target range, given the initial narrowness of the range, 2 percentage points,
helped lead to instrument instability with excessive fluctuations in monetary policy instruments.
'4Misses  of the  target  range in inflation  targeting  countries  have  been rare in recent  years and so it
might  be argued  that the controllability  problem  from  narrow  target  ranges  is overstated. However,  it is
important  to recognize  that industrialized  countries  may have  been  extremely  lucky  in recent  years, with
supply  shocks  generally  being favorable  and demand  shocks  coming  at auspicious  time which  have
helped  keep inflation  near target levels. Although  my mother  has always  told me, "being  lucky  is better
than  being  good,"  it is dangerous  to depend  on always  having  good luck. The narrow  ranges  of inflation
targets  in many  countries  may  come  back  to haunt  them in future  years.
27The opposite problem occurred in the United Kingdom in  1995 when inflation exceeded the
target midpoint by over  one  percentage point,  but without breaching the ceiling, giving the
Chancellor of  the  Exchequer  cover to  resist  the  Bank  of  England's  recommendation for
tightening of monetary policy.  The problem with a focus on the edges of the range is that it can
lead the central bank to concentrate too much on keeping the inflation rate just within the bands
rather  than trving to  hit  the  midpoint  of  the  range.  No  sensible  objective  function  for
policymakers would  justify this kind of behavior.
The disadvantages of a target range -- its leading to an excessive focus on the edges and
a  tendency for it to  be  set  too narrow -- suggest that a point  target for inflation would  be
superior.  Hiowever,  in order for a point target to be consistent with the necessary flexibility of
monetary policy, the central bank needs to communicate with the public the inherent uncertainty
in the inflation process and the ability of the central bank to hit the target.  This is exactly what
the Bank of England does in its Inflation Report where it uses the successful device of its "fan
chart" in  which  the  confidence  intervals  around the  inflation  forecast  are  displayed with
different shadings.  The Bank of England is required to report to Parliament when inflation is
more than 1 percentage point away from the inflation target,  but this  requirement is subtly
different than a range because it puts the appropriate focus on the point target rather than the
edges of the band.
Targeting Asset  Prices Like the Exchange  Rate  Worsens Performance.  Central
bank's clearly care about the value of the domestic currency as the case studies here indicate.
Changes in the exchange rate can have a major impact on inflation, particularly in small, open
economies.  For example, depreciations lead to a rise in inflation as a result of the pass through
from  higher import prices  and  greater  demand  for  exports,  particularly  in  a  small,  open
economy.  In addition, the public and politicians pay attention to the exchange rate and this puts
pressure on the central bank to alter monetary policy.  An appreciation of the domestic currency
can make domestic business uncompetitive, while a depreciation is often seen as a signal of
failure of the central bank as has recently been the case for the European Central Bank, which
has been blamed, I think unfairly, for the euro's decline.
Emerging  market  countries,  quite  correctly, have  an  even  greater  concem  about
exchange rate movements.  Not only can a real  appreciation make domestic industries less
competitive,but it can lead to large current account deficits which can make the country more
vulnerable to currency crisis  if capital inflows tum to  outflows.  Depreciations in emerging
market countries are particularly dangerous because they can trigger a financial crisis along the
28lines  suggested  in  Mishkin  (1996,  1999c).  These  countries  have  much  of  their  debt
denominated in  foreign currency and when the currency depreciates, this increases the debt
burden  of  domestic  firms  increases.  Since  assets  are  typically denominated  in  domestic
currency and  so do  not  increase  in value, there  is a  resulting decline in net worth.  This
deterioration in balance  sheets then increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
which leads to  financial instability and a sharp decline in investment and economic activity.
This mechanism explains why the currency crises in Mexico in 1994-95 and East Asian in 1997
pushed these countries into full-fledged financial crises which had devastating effects on their
economies.
The fact that exchange rate fluctuations are a major concem in so many countries raises
the danger that monetary policy, even under an inflation targeting regime, may put too much
focus  on  limiting  exchange  rate movements.  The  first problem with  a  focus on  limiting
exchange rate  movements  is  that it runs the risk  of  transforming the exchange rate  into a
nominal anchor that takes precedence over the inflation target.  Although this has not been a
problem for the industrialized countries discussed here, it has been a problem for Israel. As part
of its inflation targeting regime, Israel has had an intermediate target of an exchange rate band
around a crawling peg, whose rate of crawl is set in a forward-looking manner by deriving it
from the inflation target for the coming year.  Even though the Bank of Israel downplayed the
exchange rate target relative to the inflation target over time, it did slow the Bank's efforts to
win support for disinflation and lowering of the inflation targets (e.g., see Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin and Posen, 1999.)
A second problem is that an excessive focus on the exchange rate can induce the wrong
policy response when a country is  faced with real shocks, as suggested by the experience of
New Zealand when it kept monetary policy too tight in the face of the negative terms-of-trade
shock in 1997.'5 The correct response to a change in the exchange rate clearly depends on the
nature of  the shock that  produces the exchange rate  change.  If  a  depreciation is  due to  a
portfolio shock, then the  appropriate response is  a tightening of monetary policy, but  if the
depreciation is due  to  a  negative terms-of-trade shock, then the appropriate response  is an
easing.
The discussion above therefore suggests that targeting on an exchange rate is likely to
worsen the performance of monetary policy, and this conclusion applies equally to targeting on
other  asset prices.  Clearly,  setting monetary policy  instruments to  achieve inflation targets
15Chile  also made  a similar  policy  mistake  in 1998  because  of its focus  on limiting  exchange  rate
movements  (see Mishkin  and Savastano,  2000).
29requires factoring in exchange rate and other asset price movements.  Changes in exchange rates
and other asset prices like those on common stock have important effects on aggregate demand
and inflation and are important transmission mechanisms for monetary policy.  However, the
response to fluctuations in exchange rates and other asset prices cannot be mechanical, because
depending on  the nature of  the shocks driving these asset prices, optimal monetary policy
responds in different ways.
The argument above and the negative New Zealand experience suggest that MCI's are
probably not  a useful concept  for guiding monetary policy.  The MCI provides  information
about the stance of monetary policy only for the average type of shocks hitting the exchange rate
during the period when it was constructed. If the type of shocks change over time, then the MCI
will prove to be a faulty guide.  For example, Freedman (2000) suggests that the weights for the
Bank  of Canada's MCI were  estimated over  a  period in which  portfolio  shocks dominated
movements in the exchange rate.  In recent years, it is real shocks that dominate Canadian
exchange rate movements  and  so  the weights  in  the  Canadian MCI  are now  likely to  be
inappropriate. Furtherrnore, central banks have a lot of information to help them sort out what
type of shocks are affecting the exchange rate.  Using this information, a central bank can make
a more accurate assessment of how the exchange rate change will affect aggregate demand and




This paper has  described the experience in a number of  industrialized countries with
monetary policy strategies that make use of monetary or inflation targets.  The experience with
monetary targeting suggests, that although it was successful in controlling inflation in Switzerland
and especially Germany,  the special conditions in those two countries that made it work reasonably
well are unlikely to be satisfied elsewhere.  Inflation targeting therefore should lead to better
economic  performance for countries that choose to have an independent domestic monetary policy.
However, for inflation targeting to be successful, we need to learn the lessons from past experience.
The lessons from the industrialized countries experience outlined in this paper, hopefully, can help
guide central banks to achieve better design of their monetary policy framework.
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